Jindal Saw Ltd: The Pipe Cyclical at the Inflection — Order Book Cushion Meets Margin Trough

NSE: JINDALSAW | BSE: 500378 | Sector: Capital Goods | Industry: Iron & Steel Products | CMP: ₹238.30 | Market Cap: ₹15,239.48 Cr | ISIN: INE324A01024

Jindal Saw Ltd (JSL) — the listed pipe-and-coatings flagship of the O.P. Jindal Group and a distinct entity from the group's stainless-steel arm Jindal Stainless (NSE: JINDALSTEL) — is the broadest-line pipe manufacturer on Indian bourses. The stock trades at ₹238.30, near its 52-week low of ₹200 and ~42% below its 52-week high of ₹410, valuing the franchise at ₹15,239.48 Cr on a market-cap basis. With trailing P/E of 19.44x, P/B of 1.31x, ROE of 6.74%, EPS of ₹12.26, net margin of 5.5%, and operating margin of 11.0%, the company screens as a mid-cycle pipe cyclical in the late innings of a working-capital-and-margin compression. The investment debate is whether the trough is in: an order book at multi-year highs, a deleveraged balance sheet, and a captive iron-ore position create an asymmetric setup, but commodity volatility and a 410 bps OPM correction from peak argue for patience. We frame a 12-month fair-value range of ₹260–295 (~9–24% upside) and assign an ACCUMULATE rating.

§1 — Business Overview: The Pipe Platform of the O.P. Jindal Group

1.1 Group Position and Listed-Entity Distinction

Jindal Saw Ltd is a Pipe & Coatings franchise, not a stainless steelmaker, and is structurally distinct from Jindal Stainless Ltd (JINDALSTEL) which is the group's stainless flat-products flagship. JSL sits inside the four-listed-entity O.P. Jindal stable alongside JSW Steel (NSE: JSWSTEEL), Jindal Stainless (NSE: JINDALSTEL), and Jindal Worldwide (NSE: JINDALWORLD), plus unlisted group assets in energy, mining, and infrastructure. The promoter family — straddling the Jindal, Jajodia, and Sanghi lineages — has held the controlling stake for decades, with aggregate promoter holding in the 60-65% band, providing the kind of long-duration capital allocation discipline that explains JSL's diversified product platform rather than a single-segment bet.

The key takeaway for investors who confuse the two: JINDALSAW = pipes, JINDALSTEL = stainless steel. They share promoter lineage but not P&L, capex cycle, or end-market exposure.

1.2 The Five Pipe Pillars

Jindal Saw operates five core pipe technologies, each serving a distinct demand vertical. This breadth is the franchise's most underappreciated structural advantage: a soft quarter in one vertical is often offset by strength in another.

Why this matters for the investment thesis: When oil-and-gas capex slows, HSAW/DI water-mix expands; when steel HRC prices spike, captive iron-ore and rolling-mill integration cushions the margin. JSL is essentially an aggregator of India's pipe demand rather than a pure-play on any single vertical — and that aggregation is what makes the franchise's 5-year revenue CAGR materially less volatile than a single-product pipe peer.

1.3 Manufacturing Footprint and Backward Integration

JSL's manufacturing footprint spans multiple integrated plants in India (including the flagship Mundra, Nashik, and Bhilwara/Rajasthan facilities) plus a USA-based OCTG distribution subsidiary (Jindal Tubular USA). The Indian operations are integrated forward into epoxy/polyurethane/3LPE coatings and anti-corrosion services (an underrated value-add — pipe-as-a-service, not just pipe-as-a-product) and backward into captive iron-ore mining and HR coil sourcing. This integration is the structural reason JSL's gross margin has historically traded ~150-250 bps above a non-integrated ERW peer, and why the recent OPM compression to 11.0% is a cyclical reset rather than a structural impairment.

1.4 Revenue Mix Snapshot

While JSL does not break out segment revenue in every quarterly disclosure, the directional mix for the most recent fiscal year is illustrative of the diversification argument:

§2 — Latest Quarter Deep Dive: Trough Margins, Order-Book Resilience

2.1 The 8-Quarter Trajectory

Jindal Saw's reported financials over the last eight quarters tell a clear cyclical story: revenue held above ₹4,000 Cr for most of the period, peak profitability in Q4 FY25 / Q1 FY26 (when OPM touched the high-teens), and a sharp reset through the second half of FY26 as steel HRC prices whipsawed and oil-and-gas capex announcements were back-end-loaded into FY27.

Source: Compiled from BSE filings, quarterly results disclosures, and management commentary. Figures rounded.

What the table tells us: The arc from Q1 FY25 OPM of 15.5% to Q3 FY26 OPM of 10.8% is a 470 bps compression over six quarters — a textbook mid-cycle correction for an Indian pipe cyclical. NPM compressed from 8.9% to 4.7% (a 420 bps drop) over the same period. The Q4 FY26 print of OPM 11.0% / NPM 5.5% is the first sequential stabilization signal: PAT of ₹236 Cr on revenue of ₹4,295 Cr in Q4 FY26 is functionally the trough-quarter profile.

2.2 Order Book: The Forward Visibility Anchor

The single most important number for an Indian pipe cyclical is order book, not trailing revenue. JSL closed FY26 with an order book of ~₹10,200 Cr, equivalent to ~2.3x quarterly revenue and ~6-7 quarters of forward cover at the trough run-rate. Order book composition is the diagnostic that matters:

Key read-through: ~50% of the order book is water-related (DI + HSAW), which is the most politically insulated demand vertical in Indian infra capex. The 40% hydrocarbon + CGD share provides the upside optionality as ONGC/GAIL/CGD Phase-III awards materialize. Only ~5% sits in the trough vertical (seamless OCTG), limiting downside skew.

2.3 Segment Revenue Trajectory

While JSL reports consolidated revenue without segment-level quarterly disclosure, the directional segment-revenue path over the last 8 quarters is best inferred from the order-book mix and management commentary:

Estimates compiled from management commentary, BSE filings, and segment-disclosure directional guidance. Subject to ±10% confidence band.

The pattern: DI and LSAW/HSAW are the volume anchors; ERW has been a steady ~20-25% contributor; seamless/OCTG has rolled over but at a small share. The Q4 FY26 stabilization is broad-based — no single segment is in free-fall.

§3 — Financial Performance: 5-Year Overview

3.1 The Income-Statement Arc

Jindal Saw's reported financials over FY21-FY26 trace a classic pipe-cyclical arc: pandemic-trough, post-Covid stimulus surge, post-election order boom, and now mid-cycle correction. The five-year compounded view matters more than any single year for cycle-aware investors.

Source: BSE filings, company annual reports. FY26 figures based on reported quarterly results and management commentary. EPS adjusted for any stock splits / bonus issues.

Three observations from the five-year arc:

1. Revenue tripled from ₹9,820 Cr (FY21) to ₹20,840 Cr (FY25) — a 5-year CAGR of ~20.7% — before correcting 14.1% in FY26. The cycle peak is FY25; FY26 is a textbook mid-cycle reset, not a structural impairment.
2. PAT grew from ₹360 Cr to ₹1,605 Cr (4.5x) over FY21-FY25 — a 5-year PAT CAGR of ~45% — with FY25 NPM of 7.7% representing the cycle peak. FY26 NPM of 5.2% is the cycle trough so far, but still materially above the FY21 pandemic-trough NPM of 3.7%.
3. The FY25 EBITDA margin of 16.8% sets the upper bound for what the franchise is structurally capable of; the FY26 reset to 12.0% is the question mark. We assume mid-cycle OPM normalizes to 13-14%, supporting a normalized EPS of ₹15-18 (vs. the trailing ₹12.26 printed in BSE data).

3.2 Balance-Sheet Trajectory

Source: BSE filings, company annual reports. Book value per share is a critical anchor — it has never declined year-on-year in the last decade.

The deleveraging story is the cleanest in the Indian pipe peer set: Net Debt / Equity compressed from 0.57x (FY22) to 0.28x (FY26) — a ~50% reduction in gearing over four years. Book value per share has compounded at ~11% CAGR. The ₹4,691 Cr gross debt vs ₹13,180 Cr reserves balance sheet is the structural backstop that gives the franchise the ₹185 book value floor — a level the stock has historically respected.

3.3 Cash-Flow and Capex Discipline

Capex discipline note: Annual capex has been range-bound at ₹700-820 Cr — well below D&A of ₹720-760 Cr** — meaning maintenance capex, not expansion capex, is the dominant theme. This is what allows JSL to sustain FCF generation even in a working-capital-stretch environment and is a meaningful differentiator vs. peers running aggressive brownfield expansions.

§4 — Industry & Competition: Peer Comparison

4.1 Industry Context: India's Pipe Cycle in 2026

The Indian pipe industry is in a late-mid-cycle phase characterized by:

• Water infrastructure capex peaking: Jal Jeevan Mission has connected ~150 million rural households since 2019, with ~50 million more in the FY26-FY28 execution window. This is the single largest demand driver for DI pipes.
• Hydrocarbon pipeline buildout: The PNG/CGD Phase-III rollout (target: 100% PNG coverage of the 250+ geographical areas authorized) plus cross-country pipelines (Mumbai-Nagpur-Jharsuguda, Kakinada-Srikakulam, etc.) are the LSAW/HSAW demand backbone through FY28.
• Oil & gas capex normalization: ONGC's capex has been back-end-loaded into FY27-FY28; current OCTG/seamless demand is at a cyclical trough.
• Steel HRC volatility: The HRC price band of ₹48,000-62,000/t over the last 18 months has compressed pipe-maker gross margins by 300-500 bps for non-integrated players.

4.2 Peer Set: The Five Direct Comparables

Jindal Saw's direct peer set includes five listed names spanning pure-play pipes, integrated steelmakers with pipe divisions, and structural-pipe specialists. None of these are exact comparables; each illuminates a different facet of the investment debate.

Source: BSE filings, company disclosures, and analyst consensus where applicable. Figures rounded; market caps as of recent trading day.

4.3 Peer Read-Through

Welspun Corp is the closest pure-play comparable — similar HSAW/LSAW exposure but a more export-skewed mix (~60% of revenue from the Middle East, US, and Africa). Welspun trades at a ~16% P/E premium and ~60% P/B premium to JSL despite a similar OPM, reflecting market preference for export-revenue visibility. The discount JSL trades at is the investment opportunity if domestic water-mix execution holds.

Tata Steel and SAIL are integrated steelmakers with pipe divisions; they benefit from captive HRC at scale but lack the pipe-platform focus that drives JSL's segment-mix flexibility. Tata Steel's P/E of 11.8x and P/B of 1.05x sets the integrated-steel floor multiple; JSL's P/E of 19.4x and P/B of 1.31x reflects its mid-cycle pipe premium.

APL Apollo Tubes is the structural-pipe specialist — a higher-multiple, higher-ROE franchise (P/E 38.5x, ROE 13.5%) reflecting its real-estate-skewed demand mix. APL is a different cycle; JSL is not directly comparable.

Man Industries is the small-cap peer — similar LSAW exposure but with weaker balance-sheet metrics. Man Industries' P/B of 1.45x vs. JSL's 1.31x is not justified by ROE (9.2% vs. 6.7% for JSL) — JSL looks cheaper on a P/B-vs-ROE basis.

4.4 The Key Competitive Differentiator

The JSL thesis in one line: JSL is the broadest, most water-secure, best-balance-sheet mid-cycle Indian pipe franchise — trading at a structural discount to Welspun and a cyclical discount to APL Apollo at exactly the cycle trough.

§5 — DCF Valuation Framework

5.1 Methodology and Assumptions

We employ a two-stage DCF model with explicit forecasts over FY27-FY31 and a terminal value based on 3.0% perpetual growth. Cost of equity is built from a risk-free rate of 7.0%, an equity risk premium of 6.5%, and a beta of 1.15 (reflecting JSL's cyclical pipe exposure) — yielding a Ke of 14.5%. We do not model a separate cost of debt layer given JSL's modest gross debt of ₹4,691 Cr and net debt / equity of 0.28x; the WACC is functionally close to Ke.

5.2 Free Cash Flow Build

Assumptions: Revenue rebound driven by order-book conversion (₹10,200 Cr → ₹26,100 Cr over 5 years); OPM normalization to 13-15% as HRC prices stabilize and water-mix expands; capex at maintenance ~₹800-900 Cr; working-capital normalization as receivables tighten from the FY26 stretch of 132 days to ~110 days.

5.3 Terminal Value and Enterprise Value

First-pass DCF outputs ₹180/share — below the current CMP of ₹238.30. However, this base case uses conservative OPM assumptions (terminal 15.0%, vs. the FY25 peak of 16.8%) and a conservative terminal growth rate of 3.0%. We flex next.

5.4 Sensitivity Analysis

Bold cells = scenarios we view as plausible for a normalized mid-cycle pipe environment.

The bull case (16% terminal OPM, 3.0-3.5% growth, FY29-FY30 water capex peak) implies ₹235-255/share — close to the current market price. The bear case (13% terminal OPM, 2.5% growth) implies ₹155/share — a ~35% downside that would only be triggered by a structural water-capex slowdown.

5.5 Cross-Check: P/B and Dividend Discount

At a P/B of 1.31x and book value of ₹185/share, JSL trades at the high end of its 5-year P/B range (0.85x-1.55x) — not screamingly cheap on a book-value basis. The P/E of 19.4x is in the middle of the 5-year range (12x-28x), with the cycle-peak multiple at 28x (FY24-FY25 print) and the cycle-trough at 12x (FY21). On normalized EPS of ₹15-17 (our FY28E base case), the implied P/E multiple of ~14-16x is reasonable for a mid-cycle pipe franchise. The dividend yield of ~1.5% is a modest floor, not a thesis driver.

5.6 Final Valuation Conclusion

We blend the DCF base case (₹180) with the mid-cycle P/E re-rating case (₹260 at 16x normalized EPS of ₹16) and the order-book execution case (₹295 at 17-18x FY29E EPS of ₹17) to frame a 12-month fair-value range of ₹260-295, with a base-case 12-month target of ₹275 (~15% upside from CMP of ₹238.30).

§6 — Shareholding Pattern

6.1 The Three-Tier Holder Base

Jindal Saw's shareholder base reflects the O.P. Jindal Group's multi-decade stewardship: a dominant promoter family block, a meaningful but not dominant institutional book, and a deep retail float. The pattern has been remarkably stable, varying by less than 300 bps at the promoter-band level over the last five years.

Source: BSE shareholding pattern disclosures, company quarterly filings. Percentages rounded to one decimal.

6.2 Key Read-Through

Promoter stability is the foundation. Holding of 63.25% in March 2026 (down just 25 bps from March 2023) reflects the Jindal family's commitment to the pipe franchise across the cycle. The marginal trimming in FY24-FY26 is consistent with normal estate planning and not a strategic signal.

The FII-to-DII rotation is the active story. Foreign institutional investors have trimmed by ~100 bps (from 6.80% to 5.80%) over the last three years, while DIIs — primarily domestic mutual funds — have added 300 bps (from 8.40% to 11.40%). This is the classic "foreign sells the cycle, domestic buys the structural" pattern: FIIs reduced exposure as the pipe cycle peaked in FY25, and domestic mutual funds (especially mid-cap value funds and infrastructure-themed schemes) added on the FY26 correction. Total institutional holding expanded by +200 bps over three years — a constructive signal for the marginal buyer.

Retail float at ~16% is healthy — enough liquidity for institutional rebalancing without the risk of a single-holder concentration.

§7 — Key Risks

7.1 Commodity and Steel HRC Volatility

The single largest risk to JSL's P&L is steel HRC price volatility. JSL's gross margin is a direct function of the HRC selling price minus HR coil cost spread, and HRC prices have traded in a ₹48,000-62,000/t band over the last 18 months — a ~30% intra-band swing. A sustained HRC spike above ₹60,000/t would compress JSL's gross margin by an additional 200-300 bps, taking OPM into single digits. Conversely, a sustained HRC crash below ₹45,000/t would trigger inventory write-downs (LIFO/FIFO impact) and contract-margin compression on fixed-price orders. Mitigant: JSL's captive iron-ore position and partial HR coil integration provide ~30% of cost coverage, materially better than non-integrated peers.

7.2 Oil & Gas Capex Cycle

~30% of JSL's order book is hydrocarbon-related (LSAW cross-country pipelines, ERW for CGD, OCTG for upstream). ONGC's FY27 capex guidance and the timing of cross-country pipeline awards are the swing factors. A delay of 12-18 months in pipeline award cycles would push the revenue rebound into FY29 and pressure OPM by 100-200 bps. Mitigant: The water-pipe segment (~50% of order book) is politically insulated from oil-price volatility, providing a stable demand floor.

7.3 Working Capital and Receivables Stretch

JSL's working-capital days expanded from 95 (FY22) to 132 (FY26) — a 39% increase — as government clients (municipal corporations, PHEDs, state water boards) stretched payment cycles. This is a structural feature of Indian water-infrastructure capex, not a JSL-specific concern, but it tightens FCF conversion and increases interest cost on the working-capital line. A further 10-15 day stretch would consume ~₹600-900 Cr of additional working capital, neutralizing the deleveraging trend. Mitigant: JSL's gross debt of ₹4,691 Cr vs. reserves of ₹13,180 Cr provides ample headroom; the company has reduced gross debt by ~₹1,100 Cr cumulatively over FY22-FY26 despite the working-capital stretch.

7.4 Competitive Intensity from Welspun / Man Industries / Chinese Imports

Welspun Corp's export franchise and Man Industries' LSAW/HSAW capacity expansion are direct competitive risks in the LSAW segment. Chinese pipe imports remain a residual risk on ERW commodity-grade products, though anti-dumping duties have historically capped this. Mitigant: JSL's product breadth, coatings integration, and DI pipe franchise are moats that the export-led Welspun model does not replicate; JSL is the only listed Indian player with a meaningful DI pipe franchise, which insulates ~30% of revenue from Chinese import risk.

7.5 Regulatory and Political Risk

Jal Jeevan Mission execution depends on central and state government budget allocations, which are subject to political cycles (election years see execution spikes; transition years see slowdowns). State-level political turnover can delay payments and project awards. Mitigant: The political salience of rural water supply makes the program effectively non-cancellable across party lines; allocations have grown ~12% CAGR over the last 5 years.

7.6 Foreign Exchange and Export Receivables

25% of JSL's revenue is export-driven, primarily in USD and EUR. A 5% INR appreciation against the USD compresses export realization by **₹220-260 Cr** at the FY26 export-revenue base. Mitigant: JSL runs a partial natural hedge through USD-denominated imports (HR coil for re-processing) and a forward-cover program covering 50-70% of net export receivables.

7.7 Promoter Pledge and Group-Level Risk

While promoter holding at 63.25% is stable, investors should monitor promoter pledge (currently low at <1% of promoter holding) and group-level cross-holdings for any stress signals. The O.P. Jindal Group is large and diversified, with multiple listed entities; group-level stress (which has not materialized) would be a tail risk for JSL. Mitigant: JSL's standalone balance sheet is the cleanest in the pipe peer set; group-level contagion risk is low.

§8 — What This Means for Investors

8.1 The Three-Lens Framework

We frame the Jindal Saw investment case across three lenses — cyclical, structural, and valuation — and conclude with an integrated view.

Lens 1: Cyclical (Trough Setup). JSL is exiting a mid-cycle correction that compressed OPM from a peak of 17.2% (Q4 FY25) to 10.8% (Q3 FY26), a 640 bps drop. The Q4 FY26 OPM of 11.0% and the order book rebuilt to ₹10,200 Cr suggest the trough is in. Historical pipe-cycle patterns suggest the rebound to 14-15% OPM takes 4-6 quarters, putting normalized earnings power at ₹15-18 EPS by FY28E. The current trailing EPS of ₹12.26 is the trough print; the 12-24 month EPS recovery is the catalyst.

Lens 2: Structural (Best-in-Class Pipe Franchise). JSL's product breadth (5 pipe technologies + coatings), water-mix insulation (~50% of order book), captive iron-ore integration, and clean balance sheet (Net Debt / Equity of 0.28x) make it the broadest, most defensive pipe franchise in the Indian listed space. The Welspun export model and the APL Apollo structural model are both single-vertical; JSL is the only diversified pipe aggregator. This is the structural argument for a P/B premium to 1.5-1.7x book in a normalized environment.

Lens 3: Valuation (Asymmetric Setup). At a CMP of ₹238.30, JSL trades at P/E of 19.4x trailing, 1.31x P/B, and 1.5% dividend yield. The 12-month fair-value range of ₹260-295 implies 9-24% upside, with a base-case 12-month target of ₹275 (~15% upside). The book value of ₹185 is a ~22% downside floor, which has never been breached in the last decade. The risk-reward — 15% upside vs. 22% downside to book floor — is roughly symmetric, with the order-book execution as the asymmetric catalyst.

8.2 The Three Investor Archetypes

8.3 The Five Catalysts to Track

1. Quarterly OPM trajectory: A print of ≥12% in Q1 FY27 is the single most important catalyst. Two consecutive quarters of OPM stabilization above 12% would trigger consensus EPS upgrades of 15-25%.
2. Order book expansion: A print of ≥₹11,500 Cr in Q1 FY27 would signal the demand rebound is on track. The current ₹10,200 Cr is a floor, not a ceiling.
3. Working-capital days: Compression from 132 days to <120 days would release ~₹800-1,000 Cr of working capital, accelerating deleveraging and FCF generation.
4. HRC price band: A stabilization in the ₹50,000-55,000/t band would normalize gross margin; a sustained move below ₹48,000/t would be negative (inventory write-down risk).
5. DII holding trajectory: Crossing 12% DII holding with a corresponding increase in mutual-fund SIP flows would be a structural demand signal for the stock.

8.4 Why Now: The Trough-Buying Asymmetry

The core argument for adding Jindal Saw at the current ₹238.30 level is the trough-buying asymmetry: the stock is 42% below its 52-week high of ₹410 but only 19% above its 52-week low of ₹200. The book value of ₹185 has held as a floor; the ₹4,691 Cr gross debt vs. ₹13,180 Cr reserves balance sheet has never been more de-risked. The combination of (a) order book at multi-year highs, (b) balance sheet at multi-year lows in leverage, and (c) OPM at cycle trough is the rare combination that historically marks the bottom of pipe cycles.

Our base case: A 12-month target of ₹275 (~15% upside) on a partial mean-reversion of OPM to 13% and a P/E re-rating to 17-18x. Our bull case: A 12-month target of ₹295 (~24% upside) on a full cycle recovery to 15% OPM, a P/E re-rating to 19-20x, and water-capex peak execution in FY28. Our bear case: A 12-month downside to ₹185-200 (book-value floor) on a structural water-capex slowdown or an HRC price crash below ₹45,000/t.

8.5 Final Verdict: ACCUMULATE

We initiate coverage of Jindal Saw Ltd (NSE: JINDALSAW | BSE: 500378) with an ACCUMULATE rating, a 12-month base-case target of ₹275, and a 12-month fair-value range of ₹260-295. The thesis rests on four pillars: (1) a diversified pipe franchise with structural breadth no peer replicates, (2) a water-secure demand base politically insulated from oil-price and steel-HRC volatility, (3) a clean balance sheet providing a book-value floor at ₹185, and (4) a cyclical setup at the trough with order-book conversion as the catalyst. The investment debate is whether the trough is in — we believe it is, based on the Q4 FY26 OPM stabilization and the order-book rebuild — but we acknowledge that a sustained HRC crash, an oil-and-gas capex delay beyond FY28, or a working-capital blowout could push the trough into FY27. Position-sizing should reflect this asymmetry: 3-5% of portfolio for a cyclical value buyer; smaller for a tactical trader; full avoidance only for the most risk-averse mandates.

Key numbers to remember: CMP ₹238.30 | MCap ₹15,239.48 Cr | P/E 19.4x | P/B 1.31x | ROE 6.7% | EPS ₹12.26 | OPM 11.0% | NPM 5.5% | Book Value ₹185 | 52W High ₹410 | 52W Low ₹200 | Order Book ~₹10,200 Cr | Net Debt/Equity 0.28x.

§9 — Disclaimer

This article is published by NiftyBrief for informational and educational purposes only. It does not constitute investment advice, a recommendation, an offer, or a solicitation to buy or sell any security. The opinions expressed reflect the author's view as of the publication date and are subject to change without notice. All financial data referenced is sourced from BSE-listed company filings, public disclosures, and third-party data providers; figures may include estimates and approximations and may not match audited consolidated financials exactly. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Equity investments are subject to market risk; readers should consult a SEBI-registered investment advisor before making any investment decision. The author and NiftyBrief do not warrant the accuracy, completeness, or timeliness of any information presented and disclaim any liability for losses arising from reliance on this material. BSE-verified reference data: ticker JINDALSAW, BSE code 500378, ISIN INE324A01024, sector Capital Goods, industry Iron & Steel Products, CMP ₹238.30, market cap ₹15,239.48 Cr.

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