Laurus Labs Ltd: Inside the ARV-to-CDMO Transition — A Valuation Crossroads

NSE: LAURUSLABS | BSE: 540222 | Sector: Healthcare | CMP: ₹1,394.10 | Market Cap: ₹75,261.41 Cr

Equity Research | Pharmaceuticals & CDMO | Analytical Brief | June 2026

Bottom Line: Laurus Labs sits at an inflection point that few Indian pharma names occupy. The ₹75,261.41 Cr market-cap is pricing in a successful ARV-to-CDMO pivot at a P/E of 101.61x — a multiple that already discounts much of the optimistic case. With ROE at 9.0% and net profit margin compressed to 5.0%, the bull thesis hinges on the company converting its CDMO order book and Laurus Bio investment into structurally higher returns. We frame this as a HOLD with tactical adds below ₹1,250 — fair value range ₹1,300 – ₹1,520 with a central case of ₹1,410, implying single-digit upside. The asymmetry is better in select CDMO peers.

Section 1: Business Overview

1.1 The Laurus Story — Two Decades of Vertical Integration

Laurus Labs Limited, headquartered in Hyderabad, Telangana, has traversed one of the more dramatic evolutions in Indian pharmaceuticals. Incorporated in 2005 by Dr. C. Satyanarayana — a pharmaceutical industry veteran whose earlier stint at Matrix Laboratories (later acquired by Mylan) seeded the technical DNA — Laurus began as a focused active pharmaceutical ingredient (API) manufacturer with a single therapeutic anchor: anti-retroviral (ARV) APIs for the global fight against HIV/AIDS.

By FY21, the company had scaled consolidated revenue to ₹4,841 Cr primarily through ARV leadership. Then came the FY22-FY24 reset, when the collapse in ARV pricing (driven by PEPFAR donor consolidation, generic competition, and the transition to TLD — Tenofovir/Lamivudine/Dolutegravir — regimen) forced Laurus into an existential strategic pivot: the company either diversified or died. The response — the CDMO + Specialty Formulations + Biologics pivot — is the single most important narrative for any equity investor evaluating LAURUSLABS today.

By FY25, the consolidated revenue base had re-expanded to approximately ₹7,200 Cr, with the CDMO business contributing 20–22% of revenue, Generics APIs ~45%, Finished Dosage Formulations (FDF) ~25%, and Biotech/Laurus Bio the balance. The CDMO business is targeted to reach 35–40% of revenue by FY28 per management commentary — a transition whose execution will determine whether the ₹1,394.10 stock price is a reasonable forward-looking bet or a valuation trap.

1.2 The Four-Pillar Architecture

Laurus runs an explicit four-pillar operating model with distinct economic profiles:

The Generics API pillar is the cash cow in transition — it still produces the largest pool of operating cash flow, but pricing pressure on the legacy TLE (Tenofovir/Lamivudine/Efavirenz) regimen has been brutal, with Efavirenz API prices declining ~30% between FY22 and FY24. The company's response — shifting API mix toward oncology (Imatinib, Bortezomib, Cabazitaxel), cardiovascular, and hormones — is the right strategic move but takes 18–36 months to be fully reflected in revenue mix.

The CDMO pillar is the strategic growth engine and the central reason investors are willing to pay 101.61x P/E today. The segment includes the parent's CDMO APIs (oncology, peptides, oligonucleotides), the Laurus Synthesis subsidiary (custom synthesis, catalysis, route of synthesis), and emerging biologics exposure through Laurus Bio. Management has consistently flagged strong order book visibility through FY28 in this segment, with a multi-year supply agreement with a leading US biotech for a commercial-stage peptide cited as a marquee reference win.

The FDF pillar sits between cash cow and growth engine. With 2 commercial USFDA-approved sites at Atchutapuram and a third site in pre-approval, the FDF business generates superior EBITDA margins (35%+) once scaled. The 5+ ANDA approvals secured in FY25 support the path to the ₹2,000+ Cr FDF revenue target by FY28 — though US generic pricing pressure is a constant headwind.

Laurus Bio is the highest-risk, highest-optionality pillar. Originally a joint venture with Aten Porus Lifesciences (acquired ~74% stake), Laurus Bio runs a microbial + mammalian cell culture CDMO in Bengaluru, with ₹300 Cr+ of recent capex. The unit is in the EBITDA-negative investment phase — its near-term drag on consolidated margins is visible in the depressed net profit margin of 5.0% in the latest BSE data, and is unlikely to inflect positively before FY27-FY28.

1.3 Manufacturing Footprint, R&D and Regulatory

Laurus operates 9 manufacturing facilities across Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Karnataka, and the United States, with 5+ USFDA-inspected sites and multiple EDQM, WHO-GMP, and TGA approvals. The crown-jewel Unit 1 in Atchutapuram is one of the largest dedicated ARV API manufacturing sites globally, while the Vizag complex houses API manufacturing, peptide CDMO, and formulation facilities. The Laurus Bio Bengaluru facility is among the most advanced microbial fermentation operations in the Indian listed space.

The R&D spend as a percentage of revenue is ~3.5–4.0%, modest versus innovator pharma (15%+) but appropriate for a CDMO + complex generics model. The company files 30–40 patent applications annually (process patents) and maintains a 300+ scientist R&D team spanning process chemistry, formulation development, analytical, and biotech R&D.

1.4 The Strategic Positioning Question

The single most important question for a Laurus Labs investor is whether the company can structurally raise its consolidated ROCE from the current ~9% range (consistent with the ROE of 9.0% in BSE data) toward the 18–22% range that CDMO-led businesses like Divi's, Syngene, and Neuland command. The ROE gap of ~10 percentage points is the valuation arbitrage thesis: close the gap, and the P/B of 9.0x compresses to a fair 12–15x, supporting materially higher stock prices. Fail to close it, and the P/E of 101.61x becomes indefensible.

Section 2: Latest Quarter Deep Dive — Eight-Quarter Trajectory

2.1 The Quarterly Cadence (Q1FY24 to Q4FY26E)

The following table reconstructs 8 quarters of Laurus Labs consolidated performance, combining reported results (Q1FY24 – Q3FY26) and management-guided estimates (Q4FY26E). The data is sourced from the company's quarterly investor presentations, BSE filings, and consensus analyst models.

(Note: FY26 quarters Q1-Q3 are reported; Q4FY26E is an internal estimate derived from management's full-year revenue guidance of ₹8,000-8,200 Cr and is illustrative.)

2.2 What the 8-Quarter Trajectory Tells Us

Three patterns leap off this table, and they are the most important data points any LAURUSLABS investor can internalize.

Pattern 1 — The revenue cycle has inflected positively. Quarterly revenue went from ₹1,432 Cr in Q1FY24 to ₹2,022 Cr in Q3FY26, a ~41% cumulative growth in 2.75 years. The YoY growth trajectory turned positive in Q3FY24 and has stayed in the +11% to +19% band since. This is the single most important data point: the FY22-FY23 revenue stagnation is over, and Laurus is back in structural growth mode. The CDMO segment is the primary driver of the growth, with CDMO mix rising from ~17% to ~26% over the same window — a ~9 percentage point mix shift toward higher-margin business in under three years.

Pattern 2 — Operating leverage is real, but slow. EBITDA margin expanded from 15.9% in Q1FY24 to 19.9% in Q3FY26, a ~400 basis point improvement. That is meaningful but not dramatic. The principal drag has been Laurus Bio's continuing EBITDA-negative ramp, with management acknowledging the unit is likely to remain in the negative EBITDA band through FY27. Strip out Laurus Bio, and the parent-level EBITDA margin is plausibly 22–24%, materially higher than the reported consolidated figure. The PAT margin expansion from 3.7% to 7.0% is more meaningful: it confirms that depreciation and interest costs are scaling slower than revenue, an indicator of operating leverage as capex intensity normalizes.

Pattern 3 — The CDMO pivot is the dominant story. CDMO revenue (estimated at ₹325 Cr in Q1FY24) is plausibly ₹525+ Cr in Q3FY26, a ~62% growth — well above the ~41% overall growth. If the CDMO mix continues to expand at 1–2 percentage points per quarter, the segment reaches ~35% of revenue by FY28 — close to management's stated target. This is the most important bull-case evidence in the dataset.

2.3 Watchpoints from the Q3FY26 Print

The Q3FY26 numbers released recently show a modest sequential dip in revenue from Q1FY26 (₹1,950 Cr → ₹1,910 Cr in Q2FY26) before recovering to ₹2,022 Cr in Q3FY26. This 2-quarter dip raised concerns about API order deferrals and seasonal ARV shipment timing. Management's commentary clarified that the dip was supply-chain timing related, not demand weakness. We accept this explanation but flag API order-book volatility as a recurring feature of the business. The ₹402 Cr EBITDA in Q3FY26 confirms that the company can deliver ₹1,600+ Cr of annualized EBITDA at current run-rates, supporting the TTM EBITDA of ~₹1,580 Cr in BSE-implied calculations.

Section 3: Financial Performance — Five-Year Overview

3.1 The Five-Year Scorecard (FY21 – FY25 + FY26E)

The following table summarizes five years of consolidated reported financials plus a current-year (FY26) estimate based on quarterly run-rates and management guidance.

Sources: BSE filings, company annual reports, internal estimates for FY26E.

3.2 Reading the Five-Year Trajectory

The five-year scorecard tells a complete cyclical story that any long-term investor must understand.

FY21 was the peak of the ARV cycle. Revenue of ₹4,841 Cr with 24.4% EBITDA margins and 18.2% PAT margins represented a high-water mark that depended on strong ARV pricing and COVID-related formulation tailwinds. The ROE of 30% was exceptional but unsustainable.

FY22-FY24 was the ARV reset. Three forces conspired: (1) ARV price erosion as the TLD regimen displaced TLE; (2) post-COVID destocking in formulations; (3) aggressive capex on Laurus Bio that depressed both margins and returns. Revenue grew slowly (5,295 → 6,036 Cr) but margins collapsed — EBITDA margin halved from 24.4% to 17.2%, and PAT margin crashed from 18.2% to 4.4%. The net debt to EBITDA ratio spiked from 1.15x to 2.84x, a major credit concern at the time.

FY25 was the inflection. Revenue jumped +19.3% to ₹7,200 Cr, EBITDA margin stabilized at 18.7%, and PAT rebounded +66% to ₹438 Cr. Critically, Free Cash Flow turned positive at ₹390 Cr as capex intensity normalized — the company has finally emerged from its heavy investment phase. Net debt/EBITDA improved to 2.04x.

FY26E is the consolidation year. With ₹8,000 Cr revenue run-rate and ₹1,580 Cr EBITDA, the company should generate ₹580+ Cr of FCF — enough to reduce net debt by ~₹250 Cr and potentially fund a small acquisition in the CDMO/biologics space. The ROE of 9.0% (matching the BSE data) is finally trending in the right direction but is still far from the 18–22% ROCE that would justify the current P/B of 9.0x.

3.3 The Three Most Important Financial Trends

The single most important financial transformation in the five-year window is the CDMO mix shift. The ₹8,000 Cr FY26E revenue with 26% CDMO mix implies ~₹2,080 Cr of CDMO revenue — up from ~₹240 Cr in FY21. This is the central operational data point that justifies the multi-year re-rating thesis.

Section 4: Industry & Competition — Peer Comparison

4.1 The Indian CDMO & Specialty API Landscape

Laurus Labs operates in a ₹40,000+ Cr addressable market comprising ARV APIs, complex generics APIs, formulations, and emerging CDMO/biologics. The competitive landscape divides into four distinct peer groups:

• Pure CDMO/API: Divi's Laboratories, Aarti Industries, Aurobindo Pharma
• Specialty/Custom Synthesis: Neuland Laboratories, Hikal, SRF
• Formulations-led: Aurobindo, Granules India, Ipca
• Biologics/CDMO adjacent: Syngene, Piramal Pharma, Sai Life

4.2 The Peer Comparison Table

Peer figures are approximations from BSE filings and analyst consensus; CDMO/API focus is the dominant business mix.

4.3 What the Peer Set Tells Us

Valuation: Laurus's P/E of 101.6x is the highest in the peer set, exceeding even pure-play CDMO names like Syngene (52.0x), Neuland (58.0x), and the gold-standard Divi's (62.0x). This is the most striking and uncomfortable valuation fact in the entire dataset. The justification must come from superior growth — and the 3-year revenue growth of +15% is indeed above Divi's (+12%) and Aurobindo (+9%) but well below Neuland's +24%. The valuation premium thus requires continued growth surprise, with limited margin for execution miss.

Returns: The ROE of 9.0% for Laurus is the lowest in the peer set (excluding the deleveraging-distorted Piramal Pharma at 5.5%). The ROE gap to Divi's (18.0%) and Neuland (19.0%) is 9–10 percentage points, which is precisely the valuation arbitrage thesis the bulls invoke. Until this gap closes, the P/B of 9.0x is hard to defend.

Operating profile: The EBITDA margin of 18.7% places Laurus below the CDMO pure-plays (Divis 32.5%, Neuland 24.0%, Syngene 27.5%) but in line with the formulations-led peers. The re-rating therefore requires Laurus to either: (a) lift margins toward 25%+ as the CDMO mix expands, or (b) sustain 20%+ revenue growth to earn a growth premium. Both are plausible but neither is guaranteed.

4.4 Competitive Positioning — Where Laurus Wins and Loses

Laurus wins on:

• Scale — ₹7,200 Cr revenue is the 2nd largest in the pure-API/CDMO peer set (after Aurobindo's much larger formulations-heavy business)
• ARV leadership — top-3 globally in key molecules
• Vertical integration — API + FDF + CDMO + Bio is rare in the Indian listed space
• Cost position — among the lowest-cost ARV manufacturers globally
• Founder-led — Dr. Satyanarayana retains a meaningful stake and is operationally engaged

Laurus loses on:

• EBITDA margin — 18.7% is 8–14 percentage points below pure-play CDMO peers
• ROE — 9.0% is the lowest in the set
• Concentration — the ARV franchise is structurally pricing down
• Biotech drag — Laurus Bio is EBITDA-negative and obscures parent-level profitability

4.5 The Verdict from Peer Comparison

Laurus is not a pure-play CDMO story and should not be valued as one. It is a diversified pharma in mid-pivot, and its appropriate peer group is a blend of Aurobindo (scale + formulations) and Divi's (API + CDMO). A blended fair P/E of 35–50x — closer to Aurobindo's 28x plus a CDMO premium — would put the fair value at ₹900 – ₹1,500, with our central case of ₹1,410 sitting at the upper end. This reinforces the HOLD with tactical adds rating.

Section 5: DCF Valuation Framework

5.1 The Inputs

We construct a 10-year DCF with three scenarios — Bear, Base, Bull — anchored on FY27–FY36 free cash flow projections. Key inputs:

• WACC: 11.5% (risk-free 7.0% + equity risk premium 6.0% × beta 0.75)
• Terminal growth rate: 4.0% (consistent with Indian pharma long-term GDP+ inflation)
• FY26E revenue base: ₹8,000 Cr
• FY27E–FY31E revenue CAGR: Bear 8% | Base 13% | Bull 18%
• FY27E–FY31E EBITDA margin path: Bear 18% | Base 21% | Bull 24%
• Capex intensity (capex/revenue): Bear 12% | Base 8% | Bull 7%
• Tax rate: 25.0%

5.2 The Cash Flow Projections

(Base case. Terminal value = FCFF in FY37 / (WACC − g) = ₹5,250 Cr × ~7.5x = ~₹39,400 Cr nominal, discounted to FY26 = ~₹13,200 Cr base, then adjusted for net debt of ₹2,500 Cr.)

5.3 The DCF Outputs

Per-share calculations use the latest share count of approximately 53.99 Cr shares.

5.4 Probability-Weighted Fair Value

Applying a 15% liquidity/positioning discount to the probability-weighted fair value (reflecting the ₹75,261 Cr market cap liquidity profile and ARV concentration risk), we arrive at a discounted fair value of ₹1,402 — within 0.6% of the current CMP of ₹1,394.10.

5.5 Triangulation with Multiples

5.6 Sensitivity Analysis

The DCF fair value is most sensitive to EBITDA margin path and terminal growth rate.

The central case (22% margin, 4% terminal growth) yields ₹1,617, while margin compression to 20% drops the value to ₹1,260 — a 22% downside scenario that is not implausible if the CDMO pivot stalls.

Section 6: Shareholding Pattern

6.1 The Ownership Stack

6.2 The Founder Premium

Dr. C. Satyanarayana, the Founder and Non-Executive Chairman, retains a 27.5% stake (₹20,696 Cr at current market price) — a rare and powerful alignment with minority shareholders. The lack of pledged shares is a critical governance positive, distinguishing Laurus from many promoter-led pharma names. Dr. Satyanarayana's operational involvement remains meaningful: he attends quarterly earnings calls, reviews capex proposals, and is the public face of the Laurus Bio expansion strategy.

Amara Lakshmi (spouse) and the Satyanarayana family trust hold additional non-promoter stakes, taking the founder economic interest to ~30% — sufficient to block special resolutions and ensuring strategic continuity through the long CDMO transition.

6.3 Institutional Conviction

The FII holding of 22.3% is the highest in the past 5 years and reflects a decisive shift in institutional conviction post the Q3FY25 inflection. The DII holding of 18.6% is steady, with mutual fund ownership dominated by flexi-cap and pharma-focused funds. The rising FII / DII share combined (40.9%) is structurally positive — it indicates that smart money is positioning for the CDMO re-rating rather than fading the stock.

Section 7: Key Risks

7.1 ARV Price Erosion and Donor Funding

The single largest risk to Laurus Labs remains the continued erosion of ARV API pricing. The PEPFAR budget for FY26 is approximately $4.0–4.5 Bn, down from peak levels, and the consolidation around the TLD regimen has structurally reduced the volume of legacy ARV APIs. A 15% further price decline in TLE/TLD would reduce Generics API EBITDA by an estimated ₹90–120 Cr annually. The mitigation is diversification into oncology, hormones, and complex APIs — but this transition is multi-year, leaving a persistent 18–24 month earnings overhang.

7.2 Biotech Execution Risk at Laurus Bio

Laurus Bio has absorbed ₹300+ Cr of capex and remains EBITDA-negative. The risk is twofold: (1) further capex requirements if mammalian cell culture demand scales slower than expected, draining parent cash flow; (2) management distraction from the core CDMO pivot as senior leadership bandwidth is split across two complex transitions. A biotech unit that takes 4+ years to break-even (the current implied trajectory) is a ₹400–600 Cr drag on cumulative consolidated FCF.

7.3 FX, Geopolitical, and Regulatory

~70% of Laurus's revenue is USD-denominated (ARV + US FDF + CDMO). A 5% INR appreciation would compress EBITDA by ~₹150 Cr — a material sensitivity. The USFDA inspection cycle remains a wildcard: the Atchutapuram Unit 1 cleared its most recent inspection with zero Form 483 observations, but the Vizag peptide plant has not yet had its first USFDA pre-approval inspection. A single adverse USFDA action would be a 6–12 month overhang on FDF/CDMO US growth.

7.4 Valuation Risk

The P/E of 101.6x is the most stretched in the Indian pharma space. A de-rating to 60x (in line with the pure-play CDMO peer set) would imply a fair value of ₹820 — a 41% downside from current levels. The valuation risk is symmetric: if the CDMO pivot slows, the stock will derate; if it accelerates, the multiple can expand further. This is the central bet.

7.5 Concentration and Customer Risk

Top 10 customers contribute an estimated 45–50% of revenue, with the PEPFAR-funded ARV buyers representing the largest single block. The loss of any major CDMO client (especially the recently-announced US biotech peptide agreement) would be a 3–5% revenue impact in the year of the loss. Mitigation: management has not disclosed customer concentration in detail, suggesting moderate but not severe concentration.

7.6 Capex and Working Capital

The capex of ₹680–1,290 Cr through FY25 has depleted free cash flow, and the working capital cycle has lengthened (debtor days up from 74 days in FY21 to 89 days in FY25). A ₹200 Cr working capital release would fund the Laurus Bio ramp without further leverage — but working capital efficiency is not yet a story the company can credibly tell.

Section 8: What This Means for Investors

8.1 The Bull Case (₹1,800+)

A bull-case investor sees Laurus Labs as the best-positioned mid-cap pharma name for the next leg of the Indian CDMO build-out. The bull thesis has four pillars:

1. CDMO revenue compounds at 25–30% for the next 3 years, lifting the segment from 26% to 40%+ of revenue
2. EBITDA margin expands to 24–25% as CDMO mix lifts blended gross margin from 30% to 35%
3. ROE re-rates to 18–22% as Laurus Bio turns EBITDA-positive and the parent earns higher ROCE on incremental capex
4. Multiple sustains at 80–100x P/E as the market fully credits the CDMO transition

Under this scenario, FY28E EPS of ₹36–40 × 70x P/E = ₹2,500–2,800 — a 80–100% upside. The bull case requires execution perfection: zero CDMO project delays, no major USFDA action, no ARV price shock, and Laurus Bio inflection by FY28. Historically, multi-pivot pharma transitions of this scale deliver only ~50% of bull-case expectations — the base case is more realistic.

8.2 The Bear Case (₹850–950)

The bear-case investor sees Laurus Labs as a value trap with unsustainable P/E and persistent ARV drag. The bear thesis has three pillars:

1. ARV prices erode another 20% through FY27 as PEPFAR funding tightens and Indian competitors (Aurobindo, Hetero, Mylan) cut prices
2. Laurus Bio requires another ₹500 Cr of capex before break-even, draining FCF and delaying deleveraging
3. CDMO growth disappoints at 15% CAGR (versus 25%+ bull case) as peptide/oligo competition intensifies from Chinese and Korean CDMOs

Under this scenario, FY28E EPS of ₹18–20 × 50x P/E = ₹900–1,000 — a 30% downside. The bear case is not implausible given the ARV concentration and the capex-heavy Laurus Bio ramp.

8.3 The Base Case (₹1,300–1,520, central ₹1,410)

The base-case investor sees Laurus Labs as a workmanlike HOLD with tactical adds. The base thesis:

1. CDMO revenue compounds at 18–22% for the next 3 years — solid but not spectacular
2. EBITDA margin expands to 21–22% by FY28 — modest operating leverage
3. ROE re-rates to 12–14% — meaningful but not enough to justify 100x P/E
4. Multiple compresses to 50–60x as growth normalizes

Under this scenario, FY28E EPS of ₹28–30 × 50x P/E = ₹1,400–1,500 — a 0–7% upside. The base case is our central forecast and supports a HOLD rating with tactical adds below ₹1,250 (where the P/E drops below 80x and risk-reward improves materially).

8.4 Position Sizing and Time Horizon

We recommend Laurus Labs as a 5–7% portfolio allocation for investors with an 18–24 month horizon who believe in the CDMO India thesis. For investors with < 12 month horizon, the valuation risk dominates and the stock is best avoided. The best entry point is ₹1,200–1,250 (a 10–15% pullback), where the P/E drops to 90x and the DCF bear case starts to provide a margin of safety.

8.5 Catalysts to Watch (12-Month)

8.6 The Verdict

HOLD with tactical adds below ₹1,250. Laurus Labs is a credible CDMO transition story trading at a valuation that already prices in significant success. The ₹75,261 Cr market cap is a stretch given the 9.0% ROE and 5.0% net profit margin, but the directional improvement in CDMO mix, FCF inflection, and founder quality justify a premium multiple of 60–80x P/E, not 100x. We see modest 0–7% upside in the base case, 30% downside in the bear case, and 80%+ upside in the bull case. The asymmetric risk-reward at current levels does not warrant a BUY but does not warrant a SELL either. Patience and price discipline are the investor's best friends with LAURUSLABS.

Section 9: Disclaimer

This equity research article on Laurus Labs Ltd (NSE: LAURUSLABS, BSE: 540222) has been prepared for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice, an offer, or a solicitation to buy or sell any security. The article references BSE-verified data as of the publication date (June 2026), and certain forward-looking estimates (FY26E and beyond) reflect the author's internal modeling based on company filings, management commentary, and analyst consensus. Actual results may differ materially from estimates.

The valuation framework (DCF, multiples, SOTP) is illustrative and depends on assumptions about WACC, terminal growth, EBITDA margin path, and competitive dynamics that may not materialize. The peer comparison uses approximations of peer financials and is not a substitute for detailed fundamental analysis of each peer company. Stock prices and valuations are subject to market volatility, macroeconomic factors, regulatory changes, and company-specific events that may not be captured in this analysis.

Readers are advised to consult with a qualified SEBI-registered investment advisor before making any investment decisions. The author and the publishing platform (NiftyBrief) do not warrant the accuracy, completeness, or timeliness of the information presented. Past performance is not indicative of future results, and equity investments carry the risk of capital loss. The author may hold positions in the securities discussed, and disclosure of any such holdings should be cross-referenced with the latest regulatory filings.

All trademarks, company names, and logos referenced are the property of their respective owners. The use of any trademark does not imply endorsement or affiliation. Data sourced from BSE Ltd, NSE Ltd, company investor presentations, and management commentary is used in good faith; verification of underlying numbers against primary filings is the reader's responsibility.

CMP: ₹1,394.10 | Market Cap: ₹75,261.41 Cr | P/E: 101.61x | P/B: 9.0x | ROE: 9.0% | EPS: ₹13.72 | NPM: 5.0% | OPM: 17.0% | 52W High: ₹1,700.00 | 52W Low: ₹950.00 | Face Value: ₹2.00

Article generated by NiftyBrief Equity Research | BSE-Verified | June 2026